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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD
COMMISSION,
Appellant,
vs.
GEORGE KENDELL and IRENE H. KENDELL, his wife; EARL M. KENDELL, and
FLORA H. KENDELL, his wife; RULON
E. WILLIAMS and VIOLA R. WILLIAMS.
his wife; and UTAH SAND AND GRAVEL
PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Respondents.

Case No.
10834

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, State of Utah, appeals from a judgment of the trial court entered pursuant to a jury
verdict awarding respondents $59,500.00 for the
taking of their property at Kendall Junction, Utah.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant requests this court to reverse the
judgment of the trial court and grant a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 24, 1964, the respondent filed with the
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Weber County Clerk a complaint with the attached
condemnation resolution praying for a judgment of
condemnation and requesting an adiudication as to
the amount to be paid to defendants as just compensation for the acquisition.
A trial was held and pursuant to a jury verdict
and following a motion for remittance and alternatively a new trial a judgment was entered for $59,500.00 for defendants.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY WERE
CLEARLY EXCESSIVE IN LAW AND UNDER THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED, AND THE VERDICT IS
AGAINST THE CLEAR AND MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE AND AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD
BE SHOCKING TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT,
AND SAID VERDICT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN
GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PREJUDICE
AGAINST PLAINTIFF.

It is submitted that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a remittitur because the
amount of damages in and of themselves indicate
the award was made under the influence of passion
or prejudice.
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, justifies
a trial court in ordering a new trial or an amendment of a judgment where the damages are incorrect.
Rule 59(a) provides as follows insofar as is applicable here:
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"(a)

Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule
61, a new trial may be granted ... for any
of the following reasons:
* * *
" ( 5) Excessive or inadequate damages ap-

pearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.

" ( 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify

the verdict or alter decision or that it
is against the law.

"(7) Error in law."

The case of Geary v. Cain. 69 U. 340, 255 P. 416
construes this rule as a grant of authority to
the trial court to order a remittitur where the amount
of damages in and of themselves constitute the sole
evidence that said award was made under the influence of passion or prejudke. See also in this connection Jensen v. Railroad Co.. 44 U. 100, 138 P. 1185.
(i 927)

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
AN INSTRUCTION PERTAINING TO THE RIGHT OR
LACK THEREOF OF A PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNER
TO HAVE A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE ADJACENT TO
HIS PROPERTY.

The case of Robinette v. Price. 74 Ut. 512, 280

P. 736 (1929) is a very similar fact situation and stands
for the principle set forth above. In that case an action was brought to recover damages alleged to
have resulted to a property owner from the closing
and discontinuance of a public thoroughfare in Price
City, Utah. The evidence showed that the street on
which Plaintiff's parcel abutted, prior to the time of
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its discontinuance, gave Plaintiff a direct route to
Plaintiff's business. Following the discontinuance
the Plaintiff was required to travel about nine-tenth~
of a mile in a circuitous route from his property to
the main business portion of the city. It was then
claimed by Plaintiff that the termination of the street
depreciated the value of his property and rendered
the rental of his building maintained thereon more
difficult, and greatly decreased the rental value of
it. The Court stated in response to this claim:
"Though the travel over Ninth street is somewhat
more inconvenient in going to and from Plaintiff's
property to Main street and to the business portion
of the city than was the former route enjoyed by
him, and though the value of the rental of his property may have, as contended by him, been decreased by such a change of route, yet such inconvenience and injury are not in kind and degree spe··
cial, entitling the Plaintiff to compensation for resulting loss or injury occasioned thereby. (citing
cases.)"

The law in the Robinette case has been recently
applied by the Utah Supreme Court in Springville
Banking Company v. Burton, 10 Ut. 2d 100, 349 P.2d
157. The facts of that case showed that plaintiff
owned a lot and building thereon on the east side
of Main street in Springville, Utah. Main street, in
that city, was also a segment of a transcontinental
highway. The State Road Commission placed a concrete island in the middle of Main street, eliminating
"U" turns and left turns and denying access of south
bound Main street traffic to plaintiff's property. The
evidence further indicated that a new diversion
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highway permitted south bound traffic, seeking
plaintiff's property, to travel 1,400 to 1,500 feet further than was required to de prior to the placing of
the island in the middle of Main street.
An action was brought by plaintiff for Writ of
Mandamus seeking to require the Road Commission
to file eminent domain proceedings to assess damages alleged to have been caused by impairment
of ingress to and egress from plaintiff's property.
It is important to note that plaintiff sought no removal
of the island, but rather chose to recover damages
for interference for access to his property.
In regards to whether there was a compensable
damage, the Supreme Court, in a very definitive
statement of law, ruled that injury to ingress and
egress is not a compensable damage.
The Court stated:
"In this area of the freeway, citizens must yield to
the common weal albeit injury to their property may
result. We espouse the notion that if the sovereign
exercises its police power reasonably and for the
good of all the people when constructing highways,
consequential damages, such as those alleged here
are not compensable. On the other hand, if public
officials act arbitrarily and unreasonably, causing,
for example, total destruction of the means to get in
and out of one's property without any reasonable
justification for doing so in the public interest, in a
manner that imposes a special burden on one not
shared by the public generally, principles of equity
no doubt could be invoked to prevent threatened
action of such character or to remove any instrumentality born of such conduct."
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The Court further stated:
"If every abutter on a highway or street, where
proper authority reasonably has eliminated left or
"U" turns, could obtain damages incident to such
eventuality, the result is obvious: Highways would
remain unmarked because of the prohibitive cost
involved in payment of damages to owners on both
sides or else they vrnuld be by-passed entirely as
was in the case of State Road Commission v. Rozzelle, which accomplishment we approved.
"Highways would become increasingly more dangerous what with rapidly increasing traffic that has
evolved in the past years and which clearly will
increase further. Thousands of miles of highways
would be left with no traffic control. No city could
afford the luxury of a one-way street lest it was of
that type in the inception. Exigencies of the times
require a practical, sensible approach to the limitedaccess highway problem, with the general public
good being the primary consideration in determining each case as it arises, every case being different.
"We believe, conclude, and hold that the plaintiff
here had no cause of action by way of mandamus,
and that any damage provable here must yield
without compensation, in view of the obvious and
admitted necessity for dividing the subject highway in this case."

CONCLUSION
It is strongly urged by appellant that the errors
committed by the trial court pointed out above require a reversal of the judgment and the ordering
of a new trial..
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON

